

18 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Truscott

SUBJECT : Summary of NSCID No. 5<sup>✓</sup> Made to Accommodate General Schow's Proposals

REVISIONS

Re. Para. 1a - None - We do not believe the addition of the words "usually through the use of agent personnel" serves any useful purpose, and they imply a limitation which is not compatible with the flexibility required in the field of espionage.

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Re. Para. 3 preamble - This paragraph has been revised to establish the primacy of CIA in the clandestine field but eliminate the "glorifying" words, "the national clandestine service."

Re. Para. 3c - This paragraph has not been changed but additional words have been added to paragraph 7 to ensure that commanders will be adequately informed as to CIA liaison relationships with any foreign military establishment. This will establish a procedure whereby any specific problems a commander may have in this field can be surfaced, and appropriate local procedures worked out to handle them.

Re. Para. 3d - We believe that the designation of this function as a "service of common concern" for "the benefit of the intelligence community" is adequate assurance that this operation will not be a one-way street, and it has been revised to indicate a restriction on the type of material involved.

Re. Para. 5 - This paragraph has been revised as General Schow suggests. However, it should be understood that it relates primarily to action taken by departments and agencies other than CIA as the Agency does not normally serve requirements for clandestine collection on those other departments and agencies.

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☐ Declassified  
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Auth.: HR 70-3

Doc. No. 362R000500170004-3

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Re. Para. 7 - This paragraph has been revised to incorporate both the word "activities" and "operations" and, as indicated under the re. to paragraph 3c, has been revised to provide for informing commanders of CIA liaison relationships with foreign military establishments.

Re. Para. 8 - This paragraph has been revised to incorporate the language suggested by General Schow, but it also makes appropriate reference to the "exceptional operations" provision and to the principle that CIA, in an active theater, will operate as a component force; preservation of this principle is no less important to CIA than is the assurance to the military that CIA will be under the direct command of the theater commander.

Re. Para. 9b - This entire paragraph has been revised to provide that the IAC will do two things: (a) develop appropriate recommendations on the subject for consideration by the NSC, and (b) provide for necessary coordination on the basis of the recommendations made to and approved by the NSC. We believe that these provisions make full provision for any IAC member or invited agency concerned with the subject to propose any action he considers necessary. In such cases, normal IAC procedure will be followed.

Re. General Schow's comments on DCIDs related to NSCID No. 5  
It is our view that the requirement to have all NSCIDs presented to the NSC in January will probably not allow sufficient time for the full development of completed DCIDs. However, it is believed that the Working Group could develop an outline of the points to be covered in such DCIDs by the IAC Meeting of 14 January 1958. NSCID No. 5 is a statement of basic policy and assignment of authority and responsibility which must go forward to the NSC in January, with exceptions if that be necessary. We do not believe it can be held up because its detailed implementation has not been worked out in final form.



Asst. to the DD/C

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GENERAL COMMENTS

on NSCID No. 5

From General Schow

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1. Reference is made to the Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee (S), subject as above, dated 8 November 1957, requesting submission of written comments or suggestions on the draft NSCID No. 5.

2. Compared to previously IAC-approved NSCID revisions, the proposed NSCID No. 5 illustrates most clearly the broadened coordination responsibilities and functions of the Director of Central Intelligence which are considered necessary to achieve a "strong centralized direction of the intelligence effort of the United States through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence." With the creation of a Deputy Director for Coordination and a small staff, a "more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility by the Director of Central Intelligence" is now feasible. This closer and expanded monitorship, inevitably exerting a directive influence, will transgress previous areas of individual Departmental or Agency intelligence activities. The conduct, rather than the Intelligence Community coordination, of selected intelligence activities is now the primary CIA role.

3. Within the framework of this revised concept the Intelligence Advisory Committee is seeking an appropriate expression of functions and responsibilities for espionage and counterintelligence. Due cognizance of Service command authority over its internal resources and in response to Departmental needs must obviously be preserved. It is in this aspect of the proposed NSCID that I am primarily concerned. It appears also to me that the proposed coordination responsibility of the DCI will exceed the capability of his present small coordinating staff. This will result in a requirement for an expanded utilization of Washington CIA personnel in the role of both an Intelligence Community judge as well as the operator of CIA assets. Overseas the local CAS, as an extension of the DCI, will have the same roles to perform. An organization to provide objective and non-partisan monitorship is essential to the accomplishment of the required coordination. Only through such a structure can the free and open exchange of information and the provision of mutual support be adequate to satisfy principal U. S. authorities both overseas and at the national level.

5. Following the precedent of limited IAC approval of NSCID No. 7, I firmly believe that the draft DCID related to NSCID No. 5 should be considered by the IAC prior to final approval of the NSCID. With

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the modifications recommended in paragraph 4 I consider the proposed Directive to be fundamentally acceptable. However, the development of the DCID as a detailed extension of the broad guidance of the Directive will clarify and establish necessary implementation procedures and will confirm the appropriateness of the proposed NSCID.

#### FI Comments

1. There does not appear to be any need for detailed comments from this staff on the general philosophies set forth by General Schow in paragraphs two and three of his memorandum. Although both headquarters and field personnel will be involved in the coordination of more activities under the present Draft of NSCID 5 than is currently required, the expanded use of such personnel may not be as great as General Schow implies. At the present time our personnel are attempting to coordinate clandestine collection activities, including both espionage and clandestine counterintelligence, as well as liaison with foreign services. Thus, except for the new provisions concerning CI coordination, the only additional coordination required by the revised Draft concerns cover support requirements. More important, however, is the Army's inference that CIA personnel responsible for clandestine operations are incapable of acting as objective and non-partisan coordinators. This view is not new to us. At least one of our field representatives has reported that Armed Service personnel in the Far East have expressed agreement on the need for coordination in the intelligence field but they have voiced reservations concerning a so-called competing agency (CIA) having the responsibility for such coordination.

#### CI Comments

1. The basic position of the CI Staff in respect to both references (comments from Schow and Collins) is that the draft of NSCID No. 5 presented to the IAC on 5 November 1957 represents a minimal statement of DCI and CIA responsibilities and roles. Some of the proposals in referenced memoranda are, in effect, denials of the concept of CIA's function stated and restated by the DD/C to the IAC Working Group on 29 July, 9 October, and 14 October 1957. Therefore if either the JCS or the Department of the Army does not withdraw opposition to these key points, the best interests of the intelligence community would probably be served better by formal statements of exception to the NSC than by the DCI acceptance of the opposing views.

2. A number of the views expressed in the two references were advanced earlier, during IAC Working Group deliberations or bilateral negotiations. Changes made in the series of drafts since 9 July 1957

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were primarily attempts to accommodate these views through concessions made on both sides. It is therefore disappointing to find some of the objections restated in their original forms.

3. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Reference B (Schow comments) express general views of the Department of the Army about the present draft. These paragraphs, though somewhat lacking in clarity, contain a few assertions and inferences which require comment.

a. Paragraph 2 (of Schow comments) asserts that the "closer and expanded monitorship" of the DCI "will transgress previous areas of individual Departmental or Agency intelligence activities." Exception is taken to the word transgress, which implies fixed areas of responsibility. The obligation laid upon the intelligence community to revise all the NSCID's and the President's letter illustrate that inter-agency arrangements must be revised from time to time to meet new needs. Such revisions are not transgressions.

b. Paragraph 2 also asserts, "The conduct, rather than the Intelligence Community coordination, of selected intelligence activities is now the primary CIA role." It is the view of the CI Staff that the coordination and the conduct of clandestine U. S. functions abroad are inextricably interwoven.

c. Paragraph 3 states that "The proposed coordination responsibility of the DCI will exceed the capability of his present small coordinating staff." This assertion might be made in other respects as well. But the benefit to national interests and national security which should accrue from implementation of the present draft will probably be so marked that the basis for the assumption of new or enlarged CIA responsibilities should be the national interest rather than present capabilities or assets, which can be expanded as necessary.

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DDC Comments

I agree with General Schow that the revised NSCID #5 was designed to reflect the broadened coordination responsibilities of the DCI as recommended by the Killian Board and approved by the President.

I do not agree with General Schow that the revised NSCID #5 adds any more primacy to the CIA role in the conduct of espionage than is now contained in the present #5; the broadened coordination function is the DCI's responsibility.

I do agree that the problem of providing "objective and non-partisan monitorship" of the coordination function through the employment of DCI representatives who at the same time are "operators of CIA assets" will be a complicated but not an unsurmountable task. I assume that General Schow is concerned that his "operators" will be coordinated by their "competitors" who play the dual role of "operator" for the "DCIA" and coordinator for the DCI.

I agree that it would be worth while to have a draft DCID for consideration by the IAC at the same time as they give final approval on NSCID #5 and both the FI and CI staffs are preparing such a draft.

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